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Abstract
Negative campaigning presents parties with a collective action problem. While parties would prefer to have their
competitors attacked, potential backlash effects from negative messages mean that individual politicians typically lack
the incentives to carry out such attacks. We theorize that parties solve this problem by implementing a division of
labour that takes into account the incentives of individual office holders, their availability for campaign activity, and
media relevance. Drawing on these arguments we expect that holders of high public office and party leaders are less
likely to issue attacks, leaving the bulk of the ‘dirty work’ to be carried out by party floor leaders and general
secretaries. Examining almost 8000 press releases issued by over 600 individual politicians during four election
campaigns in Austria, we find strong support for our theoretical expectations.
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Introduction
In modern democracies electoral campaigns ought to serve
the citizens by allowing the candidates to present them-
selves, their programs, and their records and to conduct a
public debate focused on them (LeDuc et al., 2002). How-
ever, parties and candidates take an active role in these
debates also by attacking the achievements, plans, and can-
didates of competing parties. Quite simply, the parties’
strategic objectives are to appear attractive to the electorate
and at the same time to reduce the attractiveness of their
competitors. The two resulting types of behaviour are
called positive and negative campaigning, respectively.
Parties often consider negative campaigning essential
to influence the outcome of the election, as the weaknesses
of their competitors may otherwise remain unnoticed.
Riding effective attacks therefore is a task parties have to
accomplish. Yet there is a tension between the two goals
of appearing attractive and reducing the attractiveness of
others as research has established a backlash effect of neg-
ative campaigning (Lau et al., 1999, 2007).1 Even though
some studies report beneficial effects of attacks (Geer and
Lau, 2006), mass media and voters typically dislike them –
with the consequence of popularity losses for the attacker.
In multiparty systems, attacking politicians and parties may
also suffer policy and office costs, as targeted (prospective)
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coalition partners may be less willing to cooperate. As a
consequence, party elites face a disincentive to attack other
parties.
In the United States, parties and candidates have
resolved this dilemma by farming out attacks, and toxic
ones in particular, to outside groups not formally tied to a
candidate or party, the so-called (Super) PACs (Brooks and
Murov, 2012; Painter, 2014). In European party democra-
cies such farming out of campaign tasks is at best a nascent
development as political parties still dominate the contest
(Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2008). This leaves them with
two strategic dilemmas: First, how to attack competitors
while keeping the backlash effect for the party at bay? Sec-
ond, how to overcome the collective action problem that
rests in the conflict between collective party gains in terms
of discrediting competitors and individual costs in terms of
popularity losses with the electorate and poisoned relation-
ships with other parties’ politicians?
To answer these research questions we resort to two
rarely connected literatures: that on party organizations and
that on political roles. Combining these literatures we begin
building what eventually may become a theory of intra-
party roles based on various party and public offices in the
context of systems with coalition government. From there
we derive several unnecessary hypotheses which we test
with data from the last four national elections in Austria
(2002, 2006, 2008, and 2013), a typical European parlia-
mentary democracy. Parties with diverse ideological back-
grounds competed in these elections and the observation
period also includes different types of governments: Until
2006, Austria was governed by a centre-right coalition;
since then grand coalitions have been in power.
Empirically, we base our study on a content analysis of
press releases. We choose this important communication
means as it is accessible to a great number of party actors
who all should share the collective party goals but face dif-
ferent individual incentives to act upon them. Hence, this
source should reveal different degrees of negativity in the
campaign communication as a consequence of varying
roles.
Our results widely confirm this expectation. Moreover,
these differences in the level of negativity are not only
observable between subjects but also within subjects, as
shown by our analysis of a sub-group of individuals who
changed their offices – and thus their expected roles – over
time.
Intra-party roles and campaign
communication
Modern democracies are characterized by partisan dealign-
ment and increasing levels of electoral volatility (Dalton
and Wattenberg, 2000). Against this background electoral
campaigns have greatly gained in importance. It is here
where parties present their candidates, ideas for future
policies, and records, but also engage with their competitors.
This is reflected in a large and growing literature on cam-
paigns and campaigning (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Brady
and Johnston, 2006; Jacobson, 2015; Plasser and Plasser,
2002; Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002; Trent et al., 2011).
Much campaigning, this literature has shown, is negative
in the sense that its focus is not on the relevant actors’
claimed strengths but their competitors’ alleged weaknesses
and faults (Lau and Rovner, 2009; Nai and Walter, 2015).
However, research on negative campaigning has also
established a backlash effect: While attacks may hurt the
targets, they also harm the attacker (Lau et al., 1999:
856–857; Lau et al., 2007: 1182–1183). Mass media are
more likely to report negative messages but journalists may
also connect the sender to aspects of politics disliked by the
voters. Notwithstanding such a backlash effect, political
parties may have no better option than to also campaign
negatively. If no one else highlights the weaknesses of their
competitors, if, for instance, the mass media display a par-
tisan bias, are docile vis-a-vis incumbents, or simply super-
ficial, there may be no other way to make voters aware
about such faults (Geer, 2006). Leaving aside some protest
parties, parties as such are unlikely to run entirely negative
campaigns. Mixed campaigns with both negative and pos-
itive party communication are more likely so that the back-
lash effect might be contained. In addition to such
balancing, we theorize that parties can further minimize the
costs of negative campaigning by an intelligent handling of
that task.
Parties are collective organizations but organizations
can act only through individuals. According to the political
entrepreneurial perspective of politics (Laver, 1997), these
individuals ‘do not have partisan goals per se’ (Aldrich,
2011: 5). They rather have career and policy goals in gov-
ernment for which the party is an instrument. Individually
striving for such goals can lead to results that are inferior to
coordinated behaviour and hence not the best collective
outcome for political parties. In short, political parties face
a collective action problem when it comes to negative cam-
paigning. This leaves us with a double puzzle: How do
political parties manage to attack their competitors if indi-
vidual incentives for such behaviour are lacking? And how
do parties as organizations contain the detrimental effects
of negative campaigning?
Answering these research questions requires looking
into political parties and their campaign communication
in some detail. However, the literature on negative cam-
paigning in European party democracies typically uses
‘party’ as the unit of analysis and hence cannot provide
an answer to this question (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2008,
2010; Hansen and Pedersen, 2008; Schweitzer, 2010;
vanHeerde-Hudson, 2011; Walter, 2014; Walter and van
der Brug, 2013; Walter and Vliegenthart, 2010; Walter
et al., 2014). Nor did researchers who studied (female)
party leaders (Walter, 2013) or the behaviour of presidential
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candidates (Sigelman and Shiraev, 2002) look inside par-
ties. Only a study on communication patterns in a Dutch
election campaign provides some intra-party differentiation
(de Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis, 2013). Likewise, Schweit-
zer’s (2010) study of online campaigning compares party
leaders to other party representatives.
In contrast, the US literature largely focuses on individ-
ual candidates and hence allows for comparing the cam-
paign behaviour of candidates within the same party. Yet,
their competitive context is very different. In a way each
candidate for legislative office resembles a party that aims
for success in the relevant single-member constituency and
relies on his or her own campaign organization. Presiden-
tial elections, by contrast, rather resemble a team effort
as the candidates and their running mates are tied together.
In this regard Sigelman and Buell (2003) found some evi-
dence for the ‘conventional wisdom’ that vice-presidential
candidates carry the main burden of negative campaigning.
The case of US presidential elections thus suggests some
division of labour within a party’s elite in negative cam-
paigning. Such division of labour should be much more
systematic in Europe’s strong party organizations.
Although the literature on political parties has always dis-
played a strong interest in issues of organization and
intra-party politics it has not dealt with this particular ques-
tion. While we know much about the internal structures of
parties in terms of collective decision-making bodies (Katz
and Mair, 1994), the comparative literature on political par-
ties is largely silent on the internal division of labour.
This is even true for the one office given to individuals
that has received most attention, that of party leader.
Although a sizeable literature exists on party leaders, it is
mostly on their election and de-selection rather than what
they do in office (Pilet and Cross, 2014). And although
their office performance is essential in these processes the
literature typically avoids mapping their behaviour but
rather draws on external evaluations such as public opinion
polls or electoral results. The growing literature on the
importance of leaders in elections (Aarts et al., 2011; Bitt-
ner, 2011; King, 2002) also rarely focuses on their actual
behaviour during campaigns – with the major exception
of TV debates – but examines rather stable factors such
as their personality or issue positions.
Party statutes may also mention a few more positions
given to individuals – such as secretary, financial officer,
and keeper of the minutes – but typically they do not
describe these jobs in detail. Aldrich (2011: 17–18) provides
a basic differentiation based on (a) those who hold elective
office (‘office seekers’) and (b) professional communication
experts and activists (‘benefit seekers’). Yet the empirical lit-
erature has not dealt much with this topic. Regarding the
work of party employees, Webb and Kolodny described it
as ‘one of the most under-researched fields in the study of
political parties’ (2006: 337). We may therefore approach
our research question from a different angle.
This perspective is, as Kitschelt (2006: 288, note 281)
dubs it, ‘task-directed’ functionalism (which is different
from ‘explanatory’ functionalism). In this vein, Schlesinger
(1993) takes the competition in elections as the most basic
feature in the study of political parties. An ‘electoral
imperative’ dictates office-seeking parties a number of
tasks. These tasks are different from the more abstract goals
of office-seeking, policy-seeking, or vote-seeking (Mu¨ller
and Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990) which Schlesinger reserves
for individuals.2 He rather provides a list of tasks that need
to be fulfilled in the US system, ranging from the declara-
tion of candidacy to behaviour in office (1993: 484–493).
One of these tasks is dubbed ‘complex communication’
delineating the need to ‘convince voters’. As indicated
above, in modern democracies this often involves discredit-
ing competitors. Discussing different regime types, Schle-
singer indicates that the individual incentives of party
officials to cooperate in achieving the task of convincing
voters differ in unitary (parliamentary) and divided (presi-
dential) systems, with the former ones being more coopera-
tive than the latter. Yet he allows for ‘some independent
campaigning’ (1993: 490) of party nominees even in uni-
tary systems if they campaign in geographically delimited
areas or compete for different offices. Why would candi-
dates differ under these circumstances? Perhaps because
they relate to different reference groups (constituencies)
and face expectations closely tied to their respective
offices? Such ideas have been especially prominent in the
literature on political roles.
Originally, political roles have been given most atten-
tion in the study of legislatures (Blomgren and Rozenberg,
2012b; Mu¨ller and Saalfeld, 1997; Searing, 1994; Wahlke
et al., 1962). Their internal organization builds on a number
of formal offices such as president or speaker, committee
chair, and party floor leader. These offices are associated
with very distinctive formal tasks but they are additionally
often related to normative expectations about how the tasks
should be performed and how the office holders should
behave even beyond their formal duties. Leaving aside the
once dominant structural-functional approach (Blomgren
and Rozenberg, 2012a: 14–16), contemporary research has
integrated the concept of ‘roles’ into the rational choice
paradigm. In Searing’s (1994) ‘motivational approach’,
roles take a ‘purposive’ nature. They are defined according
to the purposes the politicians pursue. Specifically, Searing
distinguishes ‘position roles’, tied to specific offices that
come with strong expectations about how the role is to be
performed, and ‘preference roles’ that are less well defined
and allow politicians to pick and choose among potential
activities. Strøm (1997, 2012) has continued the move
towards a concept of rational behavior. Politicians, he
argues, have preferences they try to advance by making
strategic decisions about the employment of scarce
resources within the given institutional environment and its
incentive structures. According to Blomgren and Rozenberg,
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roles are ‘systematic behaviour’ and ‘actions that repeat
over time’ (2012a: 28–29). Roles, then, are rational responses
to institutional incentives.
One important aspect in this regard is the degree of par-
tisanship attributed to a specific office. While Wahlke
et al.’s famous dichotomy of ‘party man’ vs ‘independent,
maverick, nonpartisan’ (1962: 343–376) is not very useful
for application in contemporary European party democra-
cies, its underlying dimension is of relevance to our
research. Depending on their particular positions in the
political system, politicians can be more or less overt par-
tisans in their behaviour.
Modern role theory thus emanates from the parliamen-
tary context. Although this arena remains central in many
respects, contemporary politics has moved the political
communication battlefield out of it to a large extent. Polit-
ical actors not only rely on the mass media to transmit their
messages, they also approach them directly, tailoring their
messages according to the requirements of journalistic
transmitters and a mass audience. That is why we build a
theory of actor behaviour in this realm.
Theoretical expectations
Our theorizing starts from formal positions and most basi-
cally differentiates them into public vs party offices. These
offices can be understood as ‘positional roles’ with regard
to our variable of interest, namely negative campaigning.
While we develop strong expectations for high offices, the
incentives and opportunities for such behaviour are less
clear for many lower offices. They rather resemble Sear-
ing’s (1994) ‘preference roles’.
In order to predict a politician’s inclination to carry out
attacks we need to answer three questions: First, what is
their incentive structure to attack competitors? Second, to
what extent are they available for genuine party (rather than
public office) work? Third, what is their relevance for
media, meaning what chance do they have to get their mes-
sages reported by the mass media due to their office(s)?
Only when these questions are answered in a particular way
can we expect the individuals to internalize the party
demand upon negative campaigning, to regularly act accord-
ingly, and to achieve effect.
In terms of public offices, parliamentary regimes appear
similar enough to allow a straightforward cross-national
application, though we expect differences between systems
with single-party and coalition governments. We differenti-
ate the following public offices: head of government, cab-
inet member, and speaker of parliament. In terms of party
offices, by contrast, the empirical variation is certainly
greater. A cross-national application of our approach would
therefore require starting from the conditions we formulate
rather than the specific offices we relate to these conditions
in the Austrian context. These party offices are: party
leader, party floor leader, and party general secretary. With
respect to the six public and party offices we additionally
consider differences between parties in government and
opposition. All other holders of public and/or party office
constitute the group of ‘other politicians’.
Incentive structures
Assuming that politicians are rational actors, the first and
most fundamental question concerns the office-related
incentive structure for negative campaigning. The distinc-
tion between government and opposition is crucial for the
definition of some of the public offices and this also
impacts on the incentive structure of party offices.
Head of government. This office is the main prize of politics
in parliamentary systems. For political parties, incumbents
(most of the time) are electoral assets that need to be pre-
served. Clearly, such preservation would also serve the
career ambitions of the incumbents. Ascending to states-
manship by meeting with world leaders might help; des-
cending to mere partisan politics by engaging closely
with political competitors is more likely to have the oppo-
site effect. At the same time the job of prime ministers is to
keep the government running. This means to resolve con-
flict rather than to forge it in coalition governments. All this
suggests that heads of government have strong incentives to
avoid negative campaigning.
Cabinet member. The incentive structure for cabinet mem-
bers is similar to that of the head of government. They are
among the most visible party representatives and for the
sake of the party and their own career they should avoid
public opinion backlash. While they are not primarily
responsible for the working of the government tout court,
they clearly contribute to it. Moreover, their own success
as ministers may depend on the goodwill of coalition part-
ners. They, therefore, have an incentive not to strain rela-
tions with them and to avoid clashing with opposition
politicians by riding attacks on them.
Speaker of parliament. This office is close to the top of any
state’s formal political hierarchy and in most European
countries it is met with strong non-partisan role expecta-
tions (Jenny and Mu¨ller, 1995). While this first and
foremost means procedural fairness in the conduct of
parliamentary affairs, it is easy to see that credibility for
such behaviour may suffer from taking a leading role in
partisan attacks. Office holders may also aim for even
higher office such as head of state. In constitutional mon-
archies where this career option is not available, the posi-
tion of speaker is typically taken by elder statespersons
who have grown out of party politics. In any case, speak-
ers of parliament typically have very little motivation to
expose themselves to the backlash effect that attacks on
opponents produce.
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Party leader. The party leader is increasingly important as an
electoral asset of the party (Aarts et al., 2011; Bittner, 2011;
Costa Lobo and Curtice, 2015; McAllister, 2007). He or she
has both a party and personal incentive to avoid backlash
effects and abstain from negative campaigning. These
statements are first and foremost relative to other officials
of the same party, allowing some differences between gov-
ernment and opposition parties. Specifically, it is the role
expectation of the opposition to criticise and attack the gov-
ernment. We therefore expect that leaders of opposition
parties practice less self-constraint in negative campaign-
ing. Their taking a more active part in attacks may also
be a necessity if journalists tend not to report what less pro-
minent opposition politicians say.
Party floor leader. Although the basis of this office is a
public one – being a member of parliament – leading the
parliamentary party is a genuine party office. Leading
the party in parliamentary battles without doubt requires
attacking competitors. Yet being the party’s spearhead is
not the only task associated with this office, in particular
in government parties where floor leaders are part and
parcel of the machinery of government. In coalitions this
task typically includes the parliamentary coordination
with the other government parties. While floor leaders
of opposition parties have strong incentives to attack all
their opponents, those of government parties might be
interested in smoothing rather than straining intra-
coalition relations and to concentrate their fire on the
opposition.
Party general secretary. In his characterization of party
secretaries even in democratic parties, Duverger refers to
Lenin’sWhat is to be done? There, Lenin praised the secre-
taries’ ‘total and permanent devotion to the party’; together
with their availability (see below) this makes them the
party’s ‘real agitators’ (see Duverger, 1959: 155). Lenin’s
revolutionary avant-garde clearly represents the extreme
end but, according to Duverger, more than a kernel of truth
also for party secretaries in democratic parties. In addition
to the material rewards they receive from the party there are
also symbolic rewards from the party activists who are
believed to be more radical than passive party members and
voters and often appreciate offensive behaviour of their
leaders (see May, 1973). Despite large variation in their
internal organization, most European parties feature a func-
tional equivalent of the party secretary, usually called
general secretary or secretary general (e.g. in Germany,
Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Ireland, or the
UK), party secretary (Belgium), or party president (the
Netherlands). The job description usually features the
day-to-day operation of the extra-parliamentary party orga-
nization, in many cases including the management of elec-
tion campaigns and speaking on behalf of the party.
Other politicians. The offices we have singled out should
comprise a large share of politicians who contribute to pub-
lic campaign discourse. The remaining politicians include
MPs, parliamentary candidates, and sub-national office
holders. They tend to have less relevance for media and
quite heterogeneous incentive structures to participate in
the campaign and attack competitors in particular.
While these expectations seem plausible for the public
and party offices per se, real world politics is somewhat
more complex as several individuals combine party and
public offices. In such circumstances we expect the incen-
tives from public office to be stronger. This is in line with
Aldrich who argues that politicians take the party as ‘the
instrument for achieving’ their ‘more personal and funda-
mental goals’ (2011: 5) in public offices.
Availability for party activity
The second important question is to what extent office
holders are available for party activity. While making a
contribution to the public political debate may not require
much time per se, the precise timing of such interventions
is often crucial. Reacting too late may mean that the public
floor de facto has been left to the competitors. A too late
response may miss the editorial deadlines of important
mass media and fail to balance or override messages
from political competitors. Availability therefore to a large
extent means time flexibility and accessibility for the
party’s campaign strategists and ‘war room’ managers.
Such availability is severely limited in the case of mem-
bers of the executive who may be bound up in meetings or
international travel (especially to Brussels), duties that do
not vanish in campaign periods. Holders of high parliamen-
tary office – the presidents of parliament and the floor
leaders – should display much greater availability, as the
parliament typically is not in session when the election
approaches. This is probably less true for MPs, many of
whom will have to combine private occupation and constit-
uency campaigning.
With respect to party office holders, the party secretaries
again are most likely available. Contrary to other politi-
cians they are almost permanently present in the capital and
the party headquarters. Again Duverger’s reference to
Lenin’s work is telling: Being employed by the party, they
can serve it ‘with no interruption or hindrance due to exter-
nal cares’ (Duverger, 1959: 155).
Relevance for media
The classic criteria of ‘newsworthiness’ applied by journal-
ists include the prominence of the sender in addition to the
newness and negativity of the message (O’Neill and Har-
cup, 2009). The most likely source of prominence is high
public office followed by high party office.
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Three groups of actors seem plausible: The top group
includes the head of government and the (other) party
leaders and top candidates respectively. A middle group
comprises the members of the cabinet, the speakers of
parliament, the parliamentary floor leaders, the party secre-
taries, and leading sub-national executive officers. A third
group, finally, consists of MPs, other sub-national office
holders, and candidates without public office.
We can now bring the discussions of the three questions
together. Clearly, the incentives to attack constitute the
most important factor. Here we see that the holders of high
public office have no incentive to attack competitors. Even
party leaders have little incentive to do so, though leaders
of opposition parties and those who are serious contenders
for the office of prime minister should be more prone to
attack. Parliamentary floor leaders, especially those of
opposition parties, and the parties’ general secretaries in
particular are the offices that we see most predetermined
to ride attacks against competing parties. Conveniently,
these offices, and the general secretaries in particular, are
also endowed with the required time resources and rele-
vance for media to lend effectiveness to such behaviour.
Table 1 summarizes these expectations.
Data and methods
The present article is based on a content analysis of party
press releases. This source, to the best of our knowledge,
has been hardly used in the study of negative campaigning3
even though it has two general advantages: First, it is under
the direct control of the sender and thus adequately repre-
sents a party’s campaign strategy. Studies based on media
reports, by contrast, might suffer from the media’s negativ-
ity bias giving conflict a higher chance to get reported
(Elmelund-Praestekaer and Molgaard-Svensson, 2014;
Hansen and Pedersen, 2008; Ridout and Walter, 2015).
Second, press releases are issued frequently and continu-
ously during a campaign and therefore capture its dynamics
(Dolezal et al., 2015). For the present article this source is
best suited because of a further characteristic: In contrast to
TV debates or TV spots, press releases are not an exclusive
means for the parties’ top candidates. Press releases allow
for studying the campaign communication of a much
broader range of party representatives. Naturally, leading
politicians can easily use other means of communication
such as interviews in newspapers or TV news shows. How-
ever, press releases typically follow these channels and dis-
tribute the messages provided to a broader media audience.
In Austria, press releases are distributed via the APA,
the national news agency. They are called ‘OTS-Meldun-
gen’ (Original Text Service-Messages) and are freely avail-
able through a website (www.ots.at). This centralized
distribution increases the messages’ importance especially
for journalists who are their main audience. Research has
demonstrated that press releases strongly influence news
coverage in many countries, including Austria (Haselmayer
et al., 2015; Seethaler and Melischek, 2014).
For each of the four campaigns, we selected all press
releases sent during the last six weeks of the campaign
by the parties represented in parliament before and/or after
the election. We not only included press releases sent by
the parties’ central offices but also by their parliamentary
groups or regional branches. In a further step we manually
de-selected all press releases that only informed about com-
ing events (e.g. press conferences or campaign rallies) or
provided technical information (such as links to pictures
of candidates or audio content). Note that we deliberately
do not include press releases distributed by ministries.
These releases might have a partisan ‘touch’ but they are
rarely negative. In 2013 we only found one cabinet member
using this channel to attack an opponent.
All in all we collected 7858 press releases from seven
parties. Apart from the SPO¨ (Social Democratic Party of
Austria) and the Christian-democratic O¨VP (Austrian Peo-
ple’s Party) these parties include two populist radical right
parties, the FPO¨ (Freedom Party of Austria) and its split-
off, the BZO¨ (Alliance for the Future of Austria), the
Greens, the liberal NEOS (NEOS–The New Austria), and
the populist Team Stronach. While the SPO¨, O¨VP, FPO¨,
and Greens were present in all four campaigns, the BZO¨
was founded in 2005. The NEOS as well as Team Stronach,
by contrast, are new parties and only competed in the 2013
election (Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014; Kritzinger et al.,
2014).
In the content analysis we apply a relational method that
captures the relationship of actors (‘subjects’) with issues
or other actors (‘objects’). A variable called ‘predicate’
connects them and records their relation as either positive
(1), negative (–1), or neutral (0) (see Appendix for exam-
ples). This method goes back to the work of Kleinnijenhuis
and his collaborators (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings,
2001) and was also used in comparative research on elec-
tion campaigns and public debates (Kriesi et al., 2008,
2012). The Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES)
has developed this approach further and uses it for various
types of political texts, e.g. party manifestos (Dolezal et al.,
2014, 2016).
Given the high number of press releases we only coded
their title. However, because of the length of the headings
Table 1. Political offices and the propensity for negative
campaigning.
Office Type Political office Government Opposition
Public Head of government Low —
Cabinet member Low —
Speaker of parliament Low Low
Party Party leader Low Medium
Party floor leader Medium High
Party general secretary High High
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(a maximum of 138 characters set by the OTS-system) and
the high quality with which most press releases are written,
the content of the titles perfectly captures the basic message
of most press releases. What is more, press release titles are
the main selection criterion for journalists (only titles and
subtitles are visible when journalists scroll through the
APA system), thus our measure registers whether party
actors choose to make the attack the main point in their
communication.4
For the present article we define any negative relation
between subject and object actors, thus any form of criti-
cism, as negative campaigning (e.g. Geer, 2006: 26). Every
press release is therefore coded as 1 ‘attack’ or 0 ‘no
attack’. For both the subjects (i.e. the senders) and the
objects (the targets) names and organizational affiliation
(typically to a political party) were coded so that we can
easily identify the individual politicians who held public
or party offices. Of course, in an archetypical party democ-
racy such as Austria it is natural to find some overlap
between party and public offices. Parties reserve the high-
est public office available to them for their leaders. There-
fore, leaders of government parties typically take positions
in cabinet (mostly as Chancellor or Vice-Chancellor),
whereas opposition party leaders usually assume the posi-
tion of party floor leader in parliament.
Apart from the office variables, we also control for gender
(asmen andwomen are sometimes expected to differ in terms
ofnegative campaigning), government status, and theweekof
the campaign (as campaigns may systematically vary in
emphasis on individuals and attacks over their course).
Analysis
Media relevance, as argued above, is the precondition for
any communication strategy based on press releases;
otherwise journalists would simply neglect them. Results
from a content analysis of the news coverage of the 2013
campaign (AUTNES MedienManuell, 2013; Scho¨nbach
et al., 2014) demonstrate the high media presence of the
politicians holding the six offices we are especially inter-
ested in. Even though in 2013 these members of the polit-
ical elite comprised only 33 individuals (or four percent of
all individuals recorded in the content analysis), they were
mentioned in no less than 54 percent of all articles or tele-
vision pieces analysed. In 2008 individuals belonging to
this group were coded as ‘main actors’ in 40.7 percent of
the articles (AUTNES MedienManuell, 2008).
Figure 1 presents the level of negativity by political
office. Heads of government and leaders of parties in gov-
ernment (i.e. Vice-Chancellors) almost completely refrain
from attacking opponents. Other holders of high public
office in government and parliament exercise similar levels
of restraint. Opposition party leaders are somewhat more
likely to direct negative messages at their opponents, yet
still stay below the average level of negativity. Party floor
leaders are just above average, yet clearly not as aggressive
in their messaging as party general secretaries.
To see whether these results hold in a multivariate test,
we present a binary logistic regression with random effects
at the party-election level (Table 2) to account for structural
factors that remain constant for each party during a cam-
paign. The reference category for the political office pre-
dictors is the set of non-elite politicians that make up the
majority of all senders in the press release data.
All groups except the government party floor leaders
display statistically significant differences from the refer-
ence category, with public offices and party leaders
displaying negative coefficients and the remaining party
offices exhibiting positive effects. The odds ratios suggest
large differences between the groups, with heads of
Figure 1. Attack shares by political office. Note: A more detailed breakdown of the number of observations and attack shares by office
and election year is presented in the Appendix (Table A1).
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government and government party leaders showing the
lowest levels of negativity, and opposition floor leaders and
party secretaries the highest propensity of attacking.
To make effect sizes comparable, we present predicted
probabilities from the regression model (Figure 2). Four
groups emerge: Heads of government are clearly least
likely to attack. A somewhat higher probability of attacking
is displayed by party leaders, cabinet members, and speak-
ers of parliament. Next, government party floor leaders
exhibit a level of negativity that is indistinguishable from
that of the reference group. Opposition party floor leaders
and party secretaries have the highest probabilities of
attacking.
Taken together, these results largely confirm our expec-
tations. Politicians in high public offices that come with
expectations of non-partisanship are least likely to attack,
whereas somewhat lower-ranking positions that are also
more partisan in nature induce higher levels of negativity.
Also, government participation dampens negativity for all
party offices (although the differences are not statistically
significant for general secretaries). These marked differ-
ences according to role expectations are especially relevant
as we only included press releases distributed by partisan
channels – discarding all official government channels such
as ministries which would increase the differences even
more.
One criticism that could be levelled against our
approach is that the willingness to engage in attack beha-
viour varies primarily across individuals, and this variation
may lead to self-selection (or selection by others) into posi-
tions that come with specific role expectations. In order to
demonstrate that our findings are robust to these concerns,
we take advantage of the fact that many individuals moved
into, out of, or between high offices in our observation
period. We can thus additionally test our expectations on
a smaller sample of observations where the same individu-
als perform different roles. To arrive at this subgroup we
identify all subjects that assume more than one role (includ-
ing the reference category) across the four election cam-
paigns. In total, the pool of office switchers comprises 41
individuals (see Table A2 in the Appendix) producing over
2300 press releases.
Table 3 presents the same regression model as in Table
2, but with fixed effects at the level of individuals. Thus, all
variation left to explain is within individuals switching
between offices (we therefore drop the gender variable
which is fully accounted for by the fixed effects).5
As Table 3 shows, the results are very similar to our
analysis of the full sample. Compared to the reference cate-
gory, holders of public office and party leaders use negative
messages to a much lesser extent. The coefficients and odds
ratios for the party floor leaders imply little difference com-
pared with the reference group. The same conclusion can
be drawn for general secretaries in government parties.
By contrast, opposition party general secretaries are signif-
icantly more negative than the comparison group and thus
constitute the group most prone to attack in our subsample
of office switchers. These results strengthen our conjecture
that the attack patterns observed in the data are not driven
by self-selection of more or less aggressive types of indi-
viduals into different political roles, but by a strategic divi-
sion of labour within parties.
Conclusion
This article builds on and contributes to the literatures on
political roles and party organizations in election cam-
paigns. Our core argument holds that parties have good rea-
sons to implement a division of labour regarding negative
campaigning. While most parties clearly prefer to have
their competitors attacked during election campaigns, the
incentives for individual politicians to carry out such
attacks are limited. As our analysis shows, parties respond
to this collective action problem by shifting the bulk of the
‘dirty work’ away from party leaders and public office
holders towards the holders of genuine party positions that
come with more partisan role expectations.
In the context of parliamentary systems with coalition
governments, the collective interest of the party is served
by delegating attacks to the offices of party floor leader
and, in particular, general secretary. The latter are part of
the party leadership (most often) by means of appointment
and therefore remain accountable to the party leader. At the
same time, the party compensates them financially and
controls their further political career. More than half of all
general secretaries in our sample were promoted to minis-
terial positions after their party entered government. They
thus have a personal incentive to attack, if this is part of the
Table 2. Regression analysis.
Variable Coefficient S.E. Odds ratio
Head of government –1.839*** 0.514 0.159
Speaker of parliament –0.998*** 0.220 0.369
Cabinet member –0.902*** 0.131 0.406
Party leader (gov.) –1.358*** 0.239 0.257
Party leader (opp.) –0.886*** 0.125 0.412
Party floor leader (gov.) 0.0730 0.192 1.076
Party floor leader (opp.) 0.703*** 0.135 2.019
Party general secretary (gov.) 0.785*** 0.105 2.192
Party general secretary (opp.) 0.984*** 0.0968 2.675
Female sender –0.247*** 0.0569 0.781
Party in government 0.0170 0.124 1.017
Week-of-campaign dummies Yes
Constant –0.218* (0.100) 0.804
N 7858
Intraclass correlation 0.0161
su 0.232
Note: Figures are raw coefficients and corresponding odds ratios from a
binary logistic regression with random effects at the party-election level;
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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party’s strategy. Delegating much of the attacks to them
allows other party elites to largely stay free from such beha-
viour. They thereby follow their personal motivations and,
at the same time, do what is in the collective interest of the
party.
It is worth pointing out that the effect sizes reported in
the regression models are substantial – especially when
considering that the large sample size of almost 8000
reduces the chance that random noise produces such huge
differences. Moreover, the analysis of a subset of party
elites that switch offices between elections strengthens the
claim that the observed differences are, in fact, caused by
the intra-party division of labour and are not due to self-
selection.
Our study is a first step in building a theory of party
offices and is limited to party campaign behaviour. While
campaigning is a vital party activity, further analyses should
expand the scope of analysis to other realms. Policy innova-
tion may allow for a rather straightforward extension of our
theoretical reasoning. When parties want to change course
on an issue, for instance to expand their electoral appeal,
approach potential coalition partners, or because they now
consider earlier ideas unworkable, they may face a problem
similar to that inherent in riding attacks. Departing from
long-standing and firmly held positions can undermine a
party’s public image and electoral credibility with traditional
voter groups and cause uproar internally. In such uncer-
tainty, a division of labour might be testing the viability of
the new policy first by one high-ranking official, for instance
a minister or party policy specialist, airing it before the party
leader throws his or her authority behind it. Similar to neg-
ative campaigning, policy innovation constitutes a collective
action problem. While beneficial to the party if successful, it
also involves risks. A division of labour similar to the one
analysed in this article can resolve this dilemma.
As is true for all single-country studies, there are, of
course, limits in how far we can generalize from our find-
ings. However, since Austria is fairly typical of most West
European parliamentary democracies regarding party sys-
tem and party organizational characteristics, we are confi-
dent that a similar division of labour is present in many
parties in other countries. Even if individual incentives and
role expectations may vary somewhat between countries
and parties, there are strong reasons to assume that cam-
paign communication will be strongly diversified between
holders of different public and party offices.
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of attacking by office.
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated based on regression in Table 2; all other variables held constant at mean or mode; the government dummy was
set to one for categories that coincide with government status; 95 percent confidence intervals shown.
Table 3. Regression analysis – office switchers only.
Variable Coefficient S.E. Odds ratio
Head of government –1.687** 0.586 0.185
Speaker of parliament –0.837** 0.309 0.433
Cabinet member –1.011*** 0.287 0.364
Party leader (gov.) –1.524*** 0.347 0.218
Party leader (opp.) –1.541*** 0.390 0.214
Party floor leader (gov.) 0.200 0.425 1.221
Party floor leader (opp.) 0.203 0.257 1.225
Party general secretary (gov.) –0.00163 0.428 0.998
Party general secretary (opp.) 1.196** 0.456 3.305
Week-of-campaign dummies Yes
Individual-level fixed effects Yes
Constant 0.475* 0.222 1.608
N 2335
McFadden’s R2 0.178
Log likelihood –1304.7
Note: Figures are raw coefficients and corresponding odds ratios from a
binary logistic regression with fixed effects at the individual level; two
individuals drop from the analysis due to all negative outcomes; press
releases with two individuals as subjects discarded; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
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Appendix
Table A2. Office switchers by office and year.
Name 2002 2006 2008 2013
Bartenstein, Martin minister minister minister other
Berger, Maria other other minister
Bucher, Josef other other party leader &
party floor leader
Bures, Doris general secretary general secretary general secretary minister
Darabos, Norbert general secretary minister general secretary
Faymann, Werner other other minister & party leader head of government
& party leader
Fekter, Maria other other minister minister
Glawischnig, Eva other other speaker of parliament party leader &
party floor leader
Gusenbauer, Alfred party leader &
party floor leader
party leader &
party floor leader
head of government
Hahn, Johannes other other minister
Haubner, Ursula minister other other
Haupt, Herbert party leader & minister other
Heinisch-Hosek, Gabriele other other other minister
Karl, Beatrix other minister
Khol, Andreas party floor leader speaker of parliament other other
Kopf, Karlheinz other other other party floor leader
Kranzl, Christa other other minister
Kukacka, Helmut other minister other
Kuntzl, Andrea general secretary other other other
Lopatka, Reinhold other general secretary minister minister
Marek, Christine other other minister other
Matznetter, Christoph other minister other
Mikl-Leitner, Johanna other other minister
Missethon, Hannes other general secretary
Mitterlehner, Reinhold other minister
Molterer, Wilhelm minister party floor leader minister & party leader
(continued)
Table A1. Number of press releases and attack shares by office and year.
2002 2006 2008 2013
N % attacks N % attacks N % attacks N % attacks
Head of government 96 3.1% 33 0.0% 2 0.0% 43 4.7%
Speaker of parliament 38 23.7% 59 13.6% 43 23.3% 1 0.0%
Cabinet member 60 18.3% 62 21.0% 263 15.6% 140 16.4%
Party leader (gov.) 104 3.8% 100 14.0% 116 4.3% 74 6.8%
Party leader (opp.) 142 20.4% 138 34.1% 84 33.3% 110 36.4%
Party floor leader (gov.) 25 52.0% 18 50.0% 42 52.4% 35 31.4%
Party floor leader (opp.) 62 56.5% 62 61.3% 85 42.4% 135 40.0%
Party general secretary (gov.) 172 56.4% 103 65.0% 104 50.0% 114 66.7%
Party general secretary (opp.) 143 76.9% 188 67.6% 218 57.8% 56 42.9%
Other 1157 41.8% 1273 42.6% 1506 41.6% 1211 38.5%
Note: Sum of N per election is somewhat greater than total number of press releases because a minority of press releases have two subjects.
Table A1. The table presents the number of press releases issued by each group of office holders in each campaign. Percentages refer to the share of
releases that contained an attack. The low N for head of government in 2008 is due to the fact that the incumbent Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbauer (SPO¨),
was ousted as party leader and top candidate weeks before the election. The low N for speaker of parliament in 2013 is due to the fact that one of the
three individuals (Barbara Prammer, SPO¨) was terminally ill, and the other two (Fritz Neugebauer, O¨VP, and Martin Graf, FPO¨) had fallen out of grace
with their parties and not been re-nominated as parliamentary candidates.
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Coding procedure
In the following, we provide some examples of press
releases to explain our coding procedure in more detail.
We always present the original title, an English translation,
the ID of the press release, and the values we record for
actors and their relations. Note that press release titles often
use informal language and shorthand expressions.
In our relational content analysis we differentiate the
subject (the actor producing the message), the object (the
actor being addressed, called ‘object actor’), and the predi-
cate (a numerical variable capturing the kind of relation
between subject and object). We also record the substantive
issue of the press releases as well as additional variables
such as references to track record and justification claims
of issue positions. However, as these aspects are not rele-
vant for the present article we only explain how we capture
relations between political actors.
When coding press releases we record up to two subjects
and three object actors. In around six percent of all press
releases we find two individuals as subjects. For each actor
we record his or her name and organizational affiliation (if it
is an individual actor), for collective actors we record the
name of the organization. In most cases the subject of a press
release is an individual whereas the objects comprise indi-
vidual as well as collective actors. The title typically does
not include the first name of actors. Coders typically find this
information in the first paragraph of the press release.
Example 1. In the first example an individual actor attacks
two collective actors, i.e. parties.
 BZO¨-Petzner: FPO¨ und SPO¨ stecken in Ka¨rnten tief
im Korruptionssumpf fest
 BZO¨-Petzner: FPO¨ and SPO¨ are stuck in a swamp of
corruption in Carinthia
 ID: OTS_20130819_OTS0126
Example 2. During election campaigns, relations between
actors from different parties are mostly negative. Positive
relations primarily exist between actors from the same
party. In this example a candidate of the O¨VP praises his
own party.
 Steindl: O¨VP hat die Konzepte fu¨r mehr
Arbeitspla¨tze
 Steindl: O¨VP has the concepts for more employment
 ID: OTS_20130819_OTS0133
Example 3. In the following example an individual (male)
politician attacks an individual (female) politician. The ref-
erence to two colours refers to a potential coalition of the
Christian democratic O¨VP (‘the blacks’) and the populist
radical right FPO¨ (‘the blues’).
Table A2. (continued)
Name 2002 2006 2008 2013
Morak, Franz minister minister other
Neugebauer, Fritz other speaker of parliament
Petzner, Stefan other general secretary other
Platter, Gu¨nther minister other other
Prammer, Barbara other speaker of parliament speaker of parliament
Prokop, Liese other minister
Rauch-Kallat, Maria general secretary minister other
Scheuch, Uwe general secretary other
Schieder, Andreas other minister minister
Schu¨ssel, Wolfgang head of government
& party leader
head of government
& party leader
party floor leader
Silhavy, Heidrun other other minister
Spindelegger, Michael other other speaker of parliament party leader & minister
Strache, Heinz-Christian other party leader party leader &
party floor leader
party leader &
party floor leader
Strutz, Martin other other general secretary
Westenthaler, Peter party leader party floor leader
Table A2. lists the 41 office switchers and the positions they held across the four election campaigns. Junior ministers are coded as ministers.
Subject actor(s)
Relation
(‘predicate’)
Object actor(s)
Organization Name Organization Name
BZO¨ Petzner, Stefan –1 FPO¨ —
–1 SPO¨ —
Subject actor(s)
Relation
(‘predicate’)
Object actor(s)
Organization Name Organization Name
O¨VP Steindl, Franz þ1 O¨VP —
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 Schieder zu Fekter: ‘Schwarz-Blau’ ist der Finanz-
ministerin wichtiger als O¨sterreich
 Schieder to Fekter: For the finance minister ‘Black-
Blue’ is more important than Austria
 ID: OTS_20130822_OTS0183
Example 4. In this example an individual actor who belongs
to ‘Team Stronach’ attacks the environment minister whose
party affiliation is not mentioned in the press release. In
such a case coders have to ‘google’ or use their expertise.
 Fukushima – Stronach/Tadler: Berlakovich beweist
seine Ahnungslosigkeit
 Fukushima – Stronach/Tadler: Berlakovich demon-
strates his ignorance
 ID: OTS_20130904_OTS0220
Example 5. Here, Maria Fekter, the O¨VP’s finance minister,
attacks the SPO¨, her party’s coalition partner.
 Fekter: SPO¨ gefa¨hrdet akut Mittelstand und
Wohlstand
 Fekter: SPO¨ endangers small and medium-sized
business and prosperity
 ID: OTS_20130907_OTS0045
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Notes
1. To the best of our knowledge, no studies on the backlash effect
have been conducted for European multiparty systems (Lau
et al., 2007; Nai and Walter, 2015: 26).
2. We will argue that individual ambitions may or may not be
aligned with performing the tasks.
3. The only exceptions we are aware of are Schweitzer’s (2010)
study of campaigning in Germany and Benoit’s ‘functional anal-
ysis’ of campaign communication (e.g. Cho and Benoit, 2006).
4. We have coded negative references in subtitles for a subset of
observations (for the main government and opposition parties
in 2013, SPO¨ and FPO¨). In both cases, the share of attacks
increases by 10 percentage points. Identifying attacks based
on the full text corpus would further increase this proportion,
possibly to a point where almost all press releases would have
to be counted as attacks.
5. Importantly, we are not concerned with the sequence of offices
that individuals assume. We are only interested in the differ-
ences in attack behavior that emerge between offices.
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